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0.1 New Policy Goals and Guiding 
Principle
The 16th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China set forth econom-
ic growth and qualitative economic and so-
cial goals: the quadrupling of the 2000 GDP 
by 2020, and "building a well-off society in an 
all-round way" (fundamental achievement 
of industrialization, reduction of various so-
cio-economic gaps, establishment of socialist 
democracy and legal systems, improvement 
of the people's cultural qualities and health 
standards, and the building of a society that 
can achieve sustainable development). In ad-
dition, this CPC National Congress also ap-
proved the "Three Represents" as the new 
guiding principle hereafter. This is the idea 
that the Communist Party represents the de-
velopment trend of China's advanced pro-
ductive force, the orientation of China's ad-
vanced culture and the fundamental interests 
of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese 
people.  In actual fact, this principle opened 
the way for private entrepreneurs to become 
Communist Party members, as well as revised 
the Party Constitution.
The expectation is that in the future the 
Communist Party will be toning down its char-
acter of being a political party of ideology and 
heightening its color of development dicta-
torship the party in power that represents the 
interests of wide-ranging strata of society. The 
political report at the National Congress and 
the new Party Constitution suggest the chang-
ing course of the Communist Party.  However, 
it still cannot be affi rmed whether this will be 
in the direction of "change from a class party 
to a catch-all party."
0.2 Jiang Zemin's Victory and the Hu 
Jintao's Leading Group
The National Congress of CPC saw the 
execution of major personnel reform as a re-
sult of the appointment of a new generation 
of leaders.  For example, with the exception 
Hu Jintao, the Congress replaced all members 
of the Standing Committee of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.  In di-
vining the balance of power hereafter, atten-
tion will focus on whether Jiang Zemin will be 
able to secure his infl uence within the Party 
following his resignation as CPC General Sec-
retary. Jiang will continue as chairman of the 
CPC Military Commission; in addition, mem-
bers of his faction obtained fi ve of the nine 
seats on the Standing Committee of the Polit-
ical Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. 
Furthermore, Jiang succeeded in ensuring his 
authority through such means as having his 
name mentioned in the Party Constitution as 
the originator of the thought of "Three Rep-
resents". Therefore, the 16th National Con-
gress of the CPC produced a complete victory 
for Jiang, resulting in only a limited transfer 
of power to the newly appointed General Sec-
retary, Hu Jintao. It will be diffi cult to predict 
when and in what form this transfer of power 
will become complete.
In the fi eld of politics, Hu's leading 
group has no choice but to continue the 
course heretofore of maintaining the system 
of one-party-rule by the Communist Party, 
and in the fi eld of economic policy they shall 
promote the market economy. In order to 
put forth their own ideas, Hu's leading group 
shall carry out political reform after Jiang Ze-
min's complete retirement. However, it is dif-
fi cult to imagine Hu taking great risks to car-
ry out his own reforms.
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0.3 "Promotion of Reforms Under 
Moderate Growth" Confi rmed as 
the Economic Policy
In the fi eld of economic policy, the 
course of "Promotion of Reforms Under Mod-
erate Growth" will continue. The Tenth Five-
year Plan established this course following 
Zhu Rongji's "Three Major Reforms" (reform 
of state-owned enterprises, fi nancial reform 
and administrative reform). When executing 
policies, there should be more emphasis than 
to date placed on consideration for groups 
left behind, such as those living in inland re-
gions, farmers and the urban poor.
Personnel placements reveal other fea-
tures in addition to the "rejuvenation" indicat-
ed by the generational change to the "fourth 
generation" of leaders. For one, new lead-
ers are "better educated," meaning that they 
have higher academic background. Further-
more, they are "more competent profession-
ally," in the sense that individuals producing 
achievement in the central and regional gov-
ernments were promoted. This is a plus fac-
tor when considering the complexity of the 
environment surrounding economic manage-
ment and economic policy both the domestic 
and foreign sides.
0.4 Does Foreign Policy Continue 
Along the Deng Xiaoping-Jiang 
Zemin Line?
In the fi eld of foreign policy, Jiang Ze-
min faithfully carried on the Deng Xiaoping 
line: keep good diplomatic relations with all 
countries, improving the international envi-
ronment for the sake of economic develop-
ment and attaching importance to trilateral 
relations involving Japan, the U.S. and China. 
Following Deng's death, Jiang assumed con-
trol of personnel affairs concerning the CPC's 
central foreign policy-making organization. 
He also developed "summit diplomacy" by 
frequently visiting foreign countries and es-
tablished new slogans, such as "strategic part-
nership."  As a result, China's foreign policy 
expanded greatly and the country increased 
its engagement in ASEAN and other regional-
ism in Asia.
There are doubts, however, as to wheth-
er the new leading group will be able to take 
over and continue these achievements.  It is 
not clear whether the new form of diplomatic 
relations set forth by Jiang will continue to be 
effective in the future. In addition, the Jiang 
era was a time when the Chinese economy 
grew rapidly, providing a "tail wind" for the 
country's foreign policy.  However, there is no 
guarantee that the new leaders will be blessed 
with this type of luck.
0.5 Judicial Policy: The Confl ict Be-
tween "Rule of Law" and "Rule 
of Virtue"
As for the fi eld of judicial policy, the 
CPC's 16th National Congress report con-
fi rms the course of the Fifteenth Congress, 
which advocates the realization of a social-
ist constitutional state.  Furthermore, the re-
port stipulated it as the Merkmal of "building 
a well-off society in an all-round way". The re-
port took step forward by mentioning "the re-
alization of equity and justice in society" as 
the objective of a socialist judicial system. This 
can be praised for presenting a concrete di-
rection for the reform of the judicial system. 
However, ongoing discussion put "rule of vir-
tue" in the same category with "rule of law", 
it appears that it will require some time to es-
tablish "rule of law" in China. In addition, fol-
lowing the entrance to WTO, it has become 
urgent that China increase the transparency 
of its legal system and strictness of its judicial 
judgments. Therefore, it is required to CPC to 
make determination for improving the quali-
ty of judges and reforming judicial system.
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0.6 Reform of State-owned Enter-
prise Focuses on Privatization of 
Large SOE
The privatization of large state-owned 
enterprises commenced in earnest with the 
Resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of 
the Fifteenth Central Committee of the CPC. 
This proposed the policy of promoting the 
sale of state-owned stocks of listed companies. 
The 16th National Congress approval of party 
membership for private entrepreneurs dem-
onstrated the position that the CPC does not 
oppose the ownership of capital. This should 
further accelerate the course of privatizing 
large enterprises through the sale of state-
held stocks.
In 2001 the government decided to pro-
mote the sale on the market of listed state-
owned stocks in order to procure funds to 
supplement the pension fund. However, it 
was compelled to suspend action because of 
the sharp fall in stock prices. Since promoting 
privatization by selling on the market will be 
diffi cult for some time to come, the govern-
ment will probably proceed with privatization 
by selling state-owned stocks individually to 
persons involved internally, such as the exec-
utives and employees of large companies, and 
parties such as private companies, foreign-af-
fi liated companies and institutional investors. 
Considering the volume of state assets and 
the fund procurement capabilities and busi-
ness abilities of the buyers, it is expected that 
the process of privatization will extend over a 
long period of time.
0.7 Issues for the Next National Con-
gress
The greatest focal points leading up to 
the 2002 Seventeenth National Congress of 
CPC are:
(1) When and in what form will power be 
transferred in substance from Jiang Zemin to 
Hu Jintao?
(2) Into what kind of political party will the 
CPC advocating the "Three Represents" trans-
form?
Regarding the fi rst, the personnel-re-
lated decisions made at the National People's 
Congress in March 2003 indicated that the 
transformation of power had not fi nished. As 
for the second question, while diminishing 
the character of the vanguard party of worker 
class, the CPC has not yet taken steps to aban-
don Marxism, the Party's founding ideolo-
gy. Therefore, the effectiveness of the "Three 
Represents" will depend on whether the CPC 
will be able to become a political party that 
coordinates and represents the interests of 
the various social classes while remaining 
vague on important issues.
(Yasuo ONISHI)
